Suchergebnisse

Report considers the debate over military doctrine and strategy in the final days of the Soviet Union and the first six months of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russian Federation. Since the direction that the CIS and former Soviet republics will take should be cast in terms of their immediate past, a brief review of recent Soviet history is warranted. The report then shifts to an analysis of the organizational development of the armed forces themselves. Having considered these overall questions, the report then outlines their implications on the Navy. The source material for this report is the open- source literature and statements of authorized spokesmen in the former Soviet Union. ; The Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Postgraduate School ; http://archive.org/details/militarydoctrine00trit ; The Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Postgraduate School ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This paper opens with an examination of existing legal restraints on naval forces and arms control agreements and concludes that the U.S. is already heavily engaged in naval arms control. Given the new international security environment and the new U.S. regionally-oriented national security and military strategies, the author then recommends a series of additional naval arms control measures that should be taken: exchanges of data, transparency, INCSEA, cooperative measures, an agreement on the laws of submarine warfare, abolishing NCND, no first tactical nuclear use at sea, NWFZs, advanced notification of operational-level exercises, environmental protection measures, controls over maritime technologies, armed escorts of nuclear shipments, new Roes, PALs, the resolution of outstanding political issues at sea, deep cuts in nuclear forces, CFE follow-on, limits on specific types of naval forces, geographic limits, expanded standing naval forces, and a re negotiation of the ABM Treaty. The paper then addresses verification and compliance issues. Author concludes that since the U.S. Navy has already managed to avoid major arms control while balanced on the precarious 'slippery slope', there is no reason to continue its stonewalling policies ; Director, Conventional Arms Control & Compliance Branch ; http://archive.org/details/newcasefornavala00trit ; Prepared for conventional arms control & compliance branch, Office of the Secretary of Defense ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Chief of Naval Operations, OP-922, Washington, DC ; http://archive.org/details/projectreportonr00trit ; Naval Postgraduate School, ON&M Direct Funding ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Report of initial substantive observations made during research trip to Russia and the Ukraine during July 1992. Commentary made in the following areas: Current political issues and personalities, military science. The western theater of war, how the Russians learn about the U.S., nuclear and other hardware issues, and what the Russians and Ukrainians were interested in finding out. Report concludes that research activities were well worth costs and recommends additional activities in the future. Russia, Commonwealth of Independent States, Ukraine ; Naval Intelligence Command ; http://archive.org/details/observationsonre00trit ; The Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-12) and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DAMI-PII-T). ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The three basic elements where we traditionally commence strategic planning have changed dramatically in the past two years. A new national security strategy recasts the roles and missions of the armed forces in new terms. The submarine force needs to be justified under the new grammar for warfare as a part of the four new mission areas under the new national military strategy. The submarine force alone can perform the strategic deterrence and defense missions. The submarine's role in presence involves a high/low mix choice. There should be increased emphasis on the submarine force for crisis response: (1) rapid response (2) shore bombardment and strike (3) as the initial leading maritime component for second major regional contingencies, and (4) initial and limited sea control. A European regional war evolving out of a major regional contingency is not the same thing as the old European-centered global war with the USSR. Decreased emphasis should be placed on strategic anti- submarine warfare. Reconstitution goals could be met with at-sea nuclear weapons. Navy, Strategy, Missions. Submarine, Roles ; Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Undersea Warfare ; http://archive.org/details/submarinesrolein00trit ; OM&N Direct Funding ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This precis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's base force. Discussion of the effect of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends; (1) the behavior of the USSR (2) the behavior of allies and the Congress (3) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges, and (4) the ability of industry to meet new demands. Concludes with impact on Military Operations Research ; Director, Net Assessment and Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC; the Defense Policy Office, National Security Council Staff, Washington, DC; and the Defense Nuclear Agency HQ DNA/NASF, Alexandria, VA. ; http://archive.org/details/newnationalsecur00trit ; MIPR DDWAM0OO35, QQ005, 900038 ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Provides an analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's "base" force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return a significant amount of U.S. ground and air forces to the continental U.S. where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response much the same as has been done for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The new strategy is based upon a revised Soviet threat and new international security environment which allows us to assume two years warning of a major ground war in Europe. During this two year period, the U.S. would reconstitute additional military capability. Outline of all sources of new strategy and force structure, the "base" force, transportation requirements, and whether or not the U.S. will retain a unilateral capability for overseas Intervention. Discussion of parallel NATO initiatives. Discussion of major issues resulting from this new proposed strategy and force structure, including: is the new strategy real, defining new goals and objectives in both programming and war planning, the effect of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, new requirements for intelligence, requirements for decision-making, setting technological requirements, research & development, investment strategy and industrial conversion, reconstitution, stockpiles, impact upon DoD organization, a transition period, arms control, and new requirements for military operations research and analysis. Concludes that there are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends; (1), the behavior of the USSR, (2), the behavior of allies and the Congress, (3), the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges, and (4), the ability of industry to meet new demands. Concludes that even if it can be shown that industry cannot meet new demands, the strategy may still be useful. Section on specific impact on the Navy. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy but rather a fundamental revision to the way the U.S. has approached defense since 1945. ; Sponsored by the Director, Net Assessment and Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC; the Defense Policy Office, National Security Council Staff, Washington, DC; and the Defense Nuclear Agency HQ DNA/NASF, Alexandria, VA. ; http://archive.org/details/americapromisest9103atrit ; MIPR DDWAM00035, 90005, 90038 ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

An analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's "base" force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental U.S. where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The new strategy is based upon a revised Soviet threat, and new international security environment which assumes a two-year warning of a major ground war in Europe. During this period, the U.S. would reconstitute additional military capability. Outline of all sources of new strategy and force structure, the "base" force, transportation requirements, and whether or not the U.S. will retain a unilateral capability for overseas intervention. Discussion of parallel NATO initiatives. Discussion of major issues resulting from this proposed strategy and force structure, including: is the new strategy real, defining new goals and objectives in both programming and war planning, the effect of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, new requirement for intelligence, requirements for decision-making, setting technological requirement research & development, investment strategy and industrial conversion, reconstitution stockpiles, impact upon DoD organization, a transition period, arms control, and new requirements for military operations research and analysis. Concludes that there are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends; (1) the behavior of the USSR (2) the behavior of allies and the Congress (3) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges, and (4) the ability of industry to meet new demands. Conclusions that, even if it can be shown that industry cannot meet new demands, the strategy may still be useful. Section on specific impact on the Navy Department. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy but rather a fundamental revision to the way the U.S. has approached defense since 1945. ; Sponsored by the Director, Net Assessment and Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC; the Defense Policy Office, National Security Council Staff, Washington, DC; and the Defense Nuclear Agency HQ DNA/NASF, Alexandria, VA. ; http://archive.org/details/americapromisest9103btrit ; MIPR DDWAM00035, 90005, 900038 ; NA

An analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental U.S. where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The new national security strategy is based upon the 25% budget cut negotiated with Congress, and a revised Soviet threat and new international security environment which assumes two-years warning of a European-centered global war with the USSR. During this period, the U.S. and NATO would reconstitute additional military capability. Outline of the sources of new strategy and force structure, the Base Force, transportation requirements, and whether or not the U.S. will retain a unilateral capability for overseas intervention. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy but rather a fundamental revision to the way the U.S. has approached defense since 1945 ; Supported by the Director, Net Assessment and Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC; the Defense Policy Office, National Security Council Staff, Washington, DC; and the Defense Nuclear Agency HQ DNA/NASF, Alexandria, VA. ; http://archive.org/details/americapromisest9103ctrit ; MTPR DDWAM00035, 90005, 900038 ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Author makes case that due to recent events, initiatives in areas of naval arms control are extremely poorly timed. These events include political changes in USSR, the changing international security environment, the new Soviet military doctrine and strategy, ongoing arms control negotiations, unarticulated U.S. and NATO goals, and changes in Soviet and U.S. planning assumptions and scenarios. Author then analyses three major areas for naval arms control proposals: (1) restrictions on strategic antisubmarine warfare, (2) naval operations, and (3) strategic antisubmarine warfare technology and fanks them on technical grounds. Author reviews the goals of arms control and finds none of these three areas in need of formal regulation. Author concludes with a number of innovative areas for naval arms control in areas of doctrine, strategy, operations, and exercises with concrete recommendations and acceptable (to USN) fallback positions. (Author) (kr) ; Prepared for: Director, Defense Nuclear Agency and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations ; http://archive.org/details/navalarmscontrol90012trit ; MIPR-90-581 ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Analysis of new Soviet defense military doctrine and strategy with emphasis on strategic role of Navy and war termination. Author concludes despite Soviet wars, the USSR has not and cannot repudiate all wars, including nuclear war, since the defense of th homeland remains a necessary and objective mission of all armed forces. Author argues against separation of war into nuclear and non-nuclear components. New strategic missions for Soviet armed forces analyzed along with special considerations for military operations in maritime theaters. Author concludes that nations can allow greater amount of uncertainty in war termination decisions than is normally thought and that war termination discussions need to be separated into those supporting programming, pre-war planning, and during war. Keywords: USSR Tactical Warfare, Strategic analysis, War potential. (cp) ; Defense Nuclear Agency ; http://archive.org/details/warterminationma00trit ; MIPR 88-674, 90-581 ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Provides an analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2,1990, involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's 'base force.' If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return the bulk of U.S. ground and air forces to the continental U.S. where a significant number would be demobilized. In the event of a major war with the USSR, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces for a response to a major contingency and, if necessary, reconstitute additional military capability for a major war. The new strategy is based upon a revised Soviet threat and a new international security environment which allows us to assume two years warning of a major ground war in Europe ; Sponsored by the Director, Net Assessment and Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC; the Defense Policy Office, National Security Council Staff, Washington, DC; and the Defense Nuclear Agency HQ DNA/NASF, Alexandria, VA. ; http://archive.org/details/americapromisest00trit ; MIPR DDWAMQ0035, 90005. 90038 ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.